

PETweb – Privacy Enhancing Technology

for large scale web based services

VERDIKT Program Conference

Åsmund Skomedal

Norsk Regnesentral

Hell, Norway

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Overview

- ▶ **Background**
- ▶ **Protective measures**
- ▶ **Privacy Principals**
- ▶ **Architecture**
- ▶ **Privacy Ontology**
- ▶ **Privacy Threat Impact Analysis**
- ▶ **Summary**

Background

- ▶ **Cost of storage approaches zero – can save everything**
- ▶ **Find out what end-users actually do to handle their privacy**
- ▶ **Find out what systems do**
 - **Portal owners, System integrators, Technology providers**

Goals

- ▶ **Develop tools to analyse the impact of privacy violations**
- ▶ **Identify efficient PETs in large scale web solutions**
- ▶ **Use a Case Study:
MinSide/MyPage – the G2C portal**
- ▶ **Main partners: NR, HiG, Software Innovation, Sun, norge.no**

Summary of protective measures (1)

Findings from MSc Thesis (Høgskolen i Gjøvik) [F. Andreassen]


- ▶ **There is a strong correlation between actual use and awareness**
- ▶ **Almost everyone knows about Viruses and the need to protect against it**
- ▶ **ca 70 % use Firewalls and pop-up blockers**
- ▶ **ca 50% use anti spyware SW on average**

Why is this a problem?

In the second quarter of 2006, close to x% of checked U.S. home computers contained forms of spyware.

Who uses Anti Virus (AV) SW


Average use of anti-virus by awareness



► In total: 92.1% uses AS SW -> OK !

Who uses Firewalls (FW)


Average use of firewall by awareness



► In total: 72% uses a FW -> OK !

Who uses Pop-Up Blockers


Average use of popup-blocker by awareness



► In total: 66 % uses AS SW -> fair !


Who uses Anti Spyware (AS) SW

Average use of anti-spyware by awareness



► In total: 52 % uses AS SW and 23% don't know !

Summary of protective measures (2)



In the second quarter of 2006, close to **90%** of checked U.S. home computers contained forms of spyware.

Best guess

⇒ many get spyware without knowing about the threat

⇒ even more get it with Anti Spyware installed

When citizens use PCs to access **SENSITIVE** private information this is an issue

Privacy Principals – basis


1. Principles concerning the fundamental design of products and applications:
 - Data minimization (maximum anonymity and early erasure of data)
 - Transparency of processing
 - Security
2. Principles concerning the lawfulness of processing:
 - Legality (e.g. consent)
 - Special categories of personal data
 - Finality and purpose limitation
 - Data quality
3. Rights of the data subject:
 - Information requirements
 - Access, correction, erasure, blocking
 - Objection to processing
4. Data traffic with third countries

Privacy Principals – basis

5. **Notification requirements**
6. **Processing by a processor – responsibility and control**
7. **Other specific requirements resulting from the**
 - ▶ **Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC/,**
 - ▶ **Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC and**
 - ▶ **the Norwegian legislation.**

The grouping of privacy facilitation principles of data processing have been used by the ICPP – the Data Protection Authority of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany for the purposes of conducting privacy audits, and in particular by the catalogue of requirements of the ICPP “Privacy Seal for IT Products”

The PETweb Architecture



Privacy Objectives

- **Data protection** – fair information practices: anonymity, unlinkability, pseudonymity,
- **Unobservability**
- **Security:** Conf., Integrity, Accountability, Availab.

Threat Actor

- Intent
- Capabilities
- Opportunities

Automated

- Scripted
- Controlled
- Autonomous

Manual

v.nr.no

Threat Target

Threat

Threat Agent

1..*

0..*

0..*

1..*

Passive

Active

Privacy Ontology

Security Privacy

- Interception
- Manipulation
- Repudiation
- Denial of Service

Information Privacy

- Collection
- Processing
- Dissemination
- Invasions
- Non-compliance

as applicable

- roles (outsider, system admin, foreign, intelligent, etc)
- observing / interfering upon agreed rules

Locality threats

- global attackers (Governments)
- local attacker (Local admin)

User threats

- (sender, receiver)
- hostile user
- user errors
- user's misuse
- user abuses

Admin threats

- errors of commiss.
- errors of omission
- hostility (data, user)
- violation of user privacy policy

Developer threats

- SW containing security flaws
- input validation, integer/buffer overflows


System threats

- component fails
- degradation over time
- excess voltage

Hackers threats

- spoofing
- social engineering
- malicious code exploitation
- eavesdropping

Threat Model



Privacy Threat Impact Analysis

- ▶ **Privacy ≠ Security**
- ▶ **Model needs to capture**
 - **Capability, Intent and Opportunity**
 - **Assets, actors and threats**
 - **“Impact”**
- ▶ **Goals:**
 - **Find the weak spots -> efficient PETs**
 - **Understand how Data Subjects and Data Processors view the same threat differently**
 - **What assumptions can Service providers make on behalf of end users and their protective measures**

Privacy Threat Impact Analysis tool

For each ... calculate

▶ Asset

- Threat Types (Locality, User, Developer ... Hacker)
 - Threat Agent Properties
 - Auto/Manual, Active/Passive
 - Intent, Capability, Opportunity
 - Threat 1, Impact
 - ...
 - Threat n, Impact

Min Side (norge.no)

MinSide is an Aggregated Service Provider

- ▶ **Uses “existing” authentication methods**
- ▶ **Min ID is Identity Provider (based on SAML), federation is Possible**

Unconfirmed estimates

- ▶ **Federation is not anonymous when it can be ?**
- ▶ **Personal Information transferred (and stored) in the User PC is not protected by Min Side – and not by the average user ?**

Some open issues

- ▶ **Availability vs Privacy**
 - **What is the responsibility of the (Aggreg.) Service Provider knowing that end-user security is more or less inadequate**
 - **Should MinSide place Security requirements (SW !?) on the User PC**
 - **What about on-line security evaluations**
- ▶ **User volume vs Security**
 - **What are adequate Authentication Methods to access SENSITIVE private information**

PETweb summary

Background

- ▶ Awareness study => many users without adequate security

PETweb Framework consists of

- ▶ System Architecture
- ▶ Ontology
- ▶ Privacy Threat Model
- ▶ Privacy Impact Analysis tool

Validation of results with Min Side

- ▶ Validate the PETweb framework and tools
- ▶ Point out weak spots => identify efficient PETs
- ▶ Identify Open Issues
often a trade-off between Data Owner and Data Processor interests